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Abstract 
Fraud and corruption are gargantuan twin brothers that have limited the growth and infrastructure of many 
nations and led many firms to the road of bankruptcy. Fraud is rarely seen but the symptoms of fraud are usually 
observed. Corruption the twin brother of fraud is the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit and includes; 
bribes, cronyism and nepotism, political donations, kickbacks and artificial pricing and fraud of all kinds. 
Corruption in Cameroon has been a significant problem for many years, inhibiting investment opportunities.  
 
The paper therefore adopts the agency theory to examine the level of fraud and corruption practices in doing 
business in Cameroon and evaluate the impact of government anti-corruption policies in fighting the menace of 
fraud and corruption practices. The study employed survey research method in obtaining data. Findings in this 
study revealed that virtually all the segment of the public sector are highly corrupt and Police, Custom and Tax 
administration are the most corrupt institution in Cameroon. Although, almost all the anti-corruption initiatives 
are ranked ineffective, only the CHOC-Cameroon programme (Change Habits, Oppose Corruption) are 
considered to be effective. This could be as a result of insincerity and lack of political will by the government to 
fight fraud and corruption in the system. 
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1. Introduction 
The menace of fraud and corruption in nation building cannot be over-emphasized. Fraud and corruption are 
gargantuan twin brothers that have limited the growth and infrastructure of many nations and led many firms to 
the road of bankruptcy (Johnson-Rokosu, 2013). According to Kasum (2010), financial irregularity is a severe 
problem of concern globally. It is the major concern to developing nations, an endemic that has become a normal 
way of life. Albrecht, (2005) argued that fraud is rarely seen. However, the symptoms of fraud are usually 
observed. Fraud is a legal term that refers to the intentional misrepresentation of the truth in order to manipulate 
or deceive a company or individual. When companies undergo severe financial problems and end up in 
bankruptcy, fraud by senior management may be involved (Koh, et al., 2009). Fraud has been classified into 
three to include; asset misappropriation, corruption and fraudulent statements.  
 
There is no globally accepted definition of corruption, but it is defined by Transparency International as ‘the 
abuse of entrusted power for personal gain’. Khan (2005) put corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for 
private benefit and includes; bribes, cronyism and nepotism, political donations, kickbacks and artificial pricing 
and fraud of all kinds. Williams (2005) define corrupt practice as any immoral, illegal and unethical act and 
include cheating, lie, defraud etc. Corruption involve theft or misuse of asset, improper use of influence in a 
transaction for own benefit and falsification of financial statement, respectively. Corruption can be distinguished 
between 'true corrupt intent' and 'necessary corruption'. True corrupt intent implies bribery or an action to obtain 
an illicit benefit. While necessary corruption occurs to get things done, in other words, to obtain a legally entitled 
service; facilitation payments fall under this category of corruption. 
 
According to Business Anti-Corruption Portal (BACP), Corruption in Cameroon has been a significant problem 
for many years, inhibiting investment opportunities. Recent trends, however, demonstrate the Cameroonian 
government's willingness to address a number of corruption-related issues. For instance, after extensive efforts to 
increase transparency in its oil sector, in late-2013 Cameroon became a compliant member of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), lessening the likelihood of corruption in its resource industries. Inspite 
of Cameroonian Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives, corruption level is high in the Judicial System; Police; 
Licences, Infrastructure and Public Utilities; Land Administration; Tax Administration; Customs Administration; 
Public Procurement and Contracting; and Environment, Natural Resources and Extractive Industry. 
 
For example, in a study Gbetnkom (2012) published by the United Nations Development Programme states that 
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companies generally pay more than the official fees to get public utilities and services. For instance, only 40% of 
companies paid the official cost of USD 118 for telephone lines, while 60% paid up to almost USD 600. This 
also applies to other public services such as electricity and water connections. The study also claimed that 
bribery and the demand of facilitation payments to deliver services are frequently practiced by the Cameroonian 
police. Moreover, cronyism, nepotism, favouritism and tribalism are very common in the delivery of police 
services. In addition, despite the menace of fraud and corruption practices in public sector in Cameroon, studies 
in this area are still scanty. To this end, this paper extends the body of existing literature by examining the level 
of fraud and corruption practices in Cameroon. 
 
1.1 Objective of the study 
This study will specifically attempt to achieve the following objectives 
i. To examine the level of fraud and corruption practices in doing business in Cameroon. 
ii. To evaluate the impact of government anti-corruption policies in fighting the menace of fraud and 
corruption practices. 
 
1.2 Nature and scope of the study  
This study is empirical in nature and it basically looked at the fraud and corruption practices among public 
officials in Cameroon. However, in other to achieve the objective outlined in this study, questionnaire was 
administered to professional forensic investigators, auditors, lawyers, academic and other professionals including 
public officials seeking their opinion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical arguments on fraud and corruption practices 
Agency theory based on economic theory was first introduced by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 to explain a 
principal–agent relationship between owners (such as stockholders) and executives, with top executives acting as 
agents whose personal interests do not naturally align with shareholder interests (Albrecht, et al, 2004; Van 
Slyke, 2006; Caers, et al, 2006; Choo and Tan, 2007). Since shareholder owners of public companies are not 
normally involved in the daily operations, directors are selected to oversee, and CEOs and other professional 
managers are contracted to run, the companies (Albrecht, et al, 2004). In the same veil, citizens (general public, 
electorates) are the actual shareholders in a country, who elect leaders and representatives to hold position of 
trust and administer the economy for the well-being of all ‘shareholders’.  
 
The principal–agent relationship involves a transfer of trust and duty to the agent while assuming that the agent 
is opportunistic and will pursue interests, including executive Fraud, which are in conflict with those of the 
principal(Albrecht, et al, 2004; Choo and Tan, 2007). The principal-agent relationship between the electorates 
(principals) and leaders/representatives (agents) is that of mistrust where the agents pursue their personal 
enrichment to the misery bestow on the principals (electorates). The general understanding, according to Malmir, 
et al, (2014) is that the public service does not meet the expectations of the people and governments at all levels, 
compared with the traditional attitude of the private sector are seen as backward. The mistrust in the agency 
theory drew a lot of criticism and despite its critics, agency theory has been usefully applied to understanding a 
variety of organizational phenomena (Van Slyke, 2006; Nicholson, and Kiel, 2007). 
 
A typical solution to the agency problem in the private sector according to Choo and Tan, (2007) is to structure 
executive incentives, such as stock options, in such ways that they align executive behavior with stockholder 
goals. In public sector, most especially in developing economy, good pension incentives and fat gratuities after 
completing tenure in office with “modify Chinese solution” may align elected leaders/representatives with 
electorates’ goals and aspirations. Modify Chinese solution is empowering independent anti-corruption agencies, 
special independent fraud court to jail any indicted public officers, elected leaders/representatives to long term 
sentences and made to lose all their belongings to the state to serve as deterrence to others.  
 
Another common solution to the agency problem commonly found in the private sector is for the board of 
directors to control and curtail the “opportunistic behavior” of the executives by, for example, the audit 
committee (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Nicholson, and Kiel, 2007). In the public sector, doctrine of separation of 
power between executive, legislation and judiciary seems to be a direct response to the board of directors. 
However, unlike developed economy where the doctrine is adherence to, most developing economy operate a 
powerful executive where the presidency is ‘three-in-one’, assuming the duties of other arms of government, for 
example, Cameroon and Nigeria. This gave room for fraud and corruption practices to increase, thus making the 
presidency the most corrupt institution in Cameroon and Nigeria (see Transparency Index, 2013). 
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Applying the principles of agency theory framework, the behavior of individuals in different hierarchical levels 
of the organization, represent important variables affecting such cost monitoring, incentive and control 
mechanisms of virtual enterprise, which is mainly on enterprise content (Malmir, et al, 2014).  This theory 
highlights important issues regarding the accountability of state structures that distinguishes private structures; 
and causes agents to act and be accountable to their citizens' interests.  Although, according to Malmir, et al, 
(2014) the Principal/Agent theory does not provide a complete solution for administration accountable, but 
accountability relationships which reveal a positive step in improving accountability.  
 
2.2 The concept of Fraud and Corruption (FAC) 
Fraud means different things to different people under different circumstances. Some are legal definitions; others 
are academic, while still others are based on personal experience. The legal definition varies from country to 
country, and it is only since the introduction of the Fraud Act in 2006, that there has been a legal definition of 
fraud in England and Wales. Fraud essentially involves using deception to dishonestly make a personal gain for 
oneself and/or create a loss for another. 
 
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s define fraud as any illegal acts characterized by 
deceit, concealment, or violation of trust. These acts are not dependent upon the application of threat of violence 
or of physical force. Frauds are perpetrated by individuals and organizations to obtain money, property, or 
services; to avoid payment or loss of services; or to secure personal or business advantage. From another angle, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), described fraud as a broad legal concept that is 
distinguished from error depending on whether the action is intentional or unintentional. Fraud as a concept is a 
generic term, and embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to 
by one individual, to get an advantage over another by false representations. No definite and invariable rule can 
be laid down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways 
by which another is cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those which limit human knavery. 
 
Corruption is a form of behaviour that departs from ethics, morality, tradition, law, and civic virtue (United 
Nation on Drugs and Crime, 2005). It includes both monetary and non-monetary benefits. Corruption as a 
concept is usually difficult to define, because of its relativity multidimensional and multidisciplinary nature but 
one can put it in a perspective when it is identified for the purpose of outlining ways and means of combating it 
(Owolabi et al. p.067). Corruption on the other hand has been described to be difficult to define (Soreide, 2002; 
UNODC, 2004) but its effect cannot be under estimated. The Organization for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD) defines corruption as “the active or passive misuse of the powers of Public officials 
(appointed or elected) for private financial or other benefits”. Public corruption could occur when a member of 
the tax-paying public is given poor service or asked to pay a bribe by one who is engaged in public service: a 
judge, a policeman, a civil servant, etc. 
Corruption is seen as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Skalak, et al., 2006). 
 
Corruption is the largest single inhibitor of equitable economic development in many countries of the world 
including Cameroon and Nigeria. Corrupt practices manifest itself in various forms including; bribery, 
embezzlement, fraud, favoritism, extortion, conflict of interest, political bargains, pensions, salaries and wages, 
in legislative process as well as other areas of government business, abuse of discretion and abuse of power 
(Onakuse, 2004; Habtermicheal, 2009; Dada, 2014). It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts 
public policy, leads to the misappropriation of resources, harms the public sector and private sector development, 
and particularly it hurts the poor (Dada, 2014). 
 
Many developing nations enact laws, set up tribunals, probe panels and established anticorruption institutions to 
combat the menace of fraud and corruption, but all these laws did not reduce cases of corrupt practices (Owolabi, 
2007; Dada, 2014). It appears most that lack of forensic investigative skills ensures unsuccessful prosecution of 
persons accused of corrupt practices. There is therefore the need to adopt effective investigation technique that 
will assist the anticorruption institutions to successfully reduce corruption. Forensic accounting technique is fast 
becoming popular in providing evidence in the prosecution of corruption and in disputes resolution. It provides 
an accounting analysis that is suitable to the court which will form the basis for discussion, debate and ultimately 
dispute resolution. Forensic Accounting encompasses both litigation support and investigative accounting (Dada, 
2014). 
3. Research methodology 
To analyze the level of fraud and corruption practices in doing business in Cameroon, this study intends to 
evaluate the impact of government anti-corruption policies in fighting the menace of fraud and corruption 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.4, 2015 
 
206 
practices. The study employed survey research method in obtaining data. Questionnaire copies totaling 750 were 
administered to respondents, however, one hundred and thirty five (135) copies of the questionnaires were not 
returned representing 18% of the total respondents. Therefore, six hundred and fifteen (615) copies returned 
were analyzed using descriptive statistics.  
4. Discussion of findings 
The levels of fraud and corruption practices in the different segment of the public sector can be categorized into 
three, according to Business Anti-Corruption Portal (BACP) namely individual, business and political 
corruption.  
• Individual Corruption: Corruption that takes place primarily in relations between individual citizens 
and public officials and authorities. 
• Business Corruption: Corruption that takes place primarily in relations between enterprises/companies 
and public officials and authorities. 
• Political Corruption: Corruption that takes place in the higher echelons of public administration and 
on a political level. 
Findings in this study revealed that virtually all the segment of the public sector are highly corrupt. Findings 
show that approximately 47% and above of the respondents indicated that Police, Custom and Tax administration 
are the most corrupt institution in Cameroon. This collaborate Transparency International's Global Corruption 
Barometer 2013 and US Department of State 2013 reports about fraud and corruption practice in Cameroon (see 
table1 below).   
 
According to Business Anti-Corruption Portal (BACP) the Cameroonian police are perceived to be the most 
corrupt public institution in the country. The US Department of State 2013 lists a few examples of how 
corruption takes place between the police and citizens; individuals reportedly pay bribes to the police to secure 
their freedom or to pass through police checkpoints. In addition, influential people reportedly bribe the police to 
arrest or harass individuals involved in their personal disputes. According to a Gbetnkom (2012), police officials 
and gendarmes often profit from roadblocks to extort bribes from travellers. From Table 1 above, it is evidence 
that Judicial System (47%), Public Procurement and Contracting (48%), Environment, Natural Resources and 
Extractive Industry (47%), Environment, Natural Resources and Extractive Industry(47%) are highly corrupt. 
According to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2013, a large number of Cameroonians 
Table 1: Level of Fraud and Corruption Practices in doing business
Strongly agree undecided disagree strongly total
agree disagree
Judicial System 292 143 54 87 39 615
% of Respondent's view 47% 23% 9% 14% 6% 100%
Police 317 139 49 36 74 615
% of Respondent's view 52% 23% 8% 6% 12% 100%
Licences, Infrastructure and Public Utilities 276 199 67 33 40 615
% of Respondent's view 45% 32% 11% 5% 7% 100%
Land Administration 264 115 39 121 76 615
% of Respondent's view 43% 19% 6% 20% 12% 100%
Tax Administration 289 148 49 32 97 615
% of Respondent's view 47% 24% 8% 5% 16% 100%
Customs Administration 302 161 12 44 96 615
% of Respondent's view 49% 26% 2% 7% 16% 100%
Public Procurement and Contracting 297 157 17 93 51 615
% of Respondent's view 48% 26% 3% 15% 8% 100%
Environment, Natural Resources and Extractive Industry 290 144 13 87 81 615
% of Respondent's view 47% 23% 2% 14% 13% 100%
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perceive the judiciary to be highly corrupt. Confidence in the judiciary is very low. Business Anti-Corruption 
Portal (BACP) points out that Magistrates in Cameroon are known to favour their own religious, ethnic and 
political affiliations, as well as their own economic interests, when pronouncing verdicts. Similarly, the US 
Department of State 2013 reports that the bribery of judicial authorities remains a problem. The report notes that 
judicial authorities accept bribes from relatives of detainees for a reduced sentence or for outright release. 
Table 2 above gives a detailed of the impact of government anti-corruption initiatives. Finding reveals that 
whistleblowing (70%), anti-corruption agency(61%) and extractive industries transparency initiative (60%) 
ranked highest among the ineffective policies. 
 
Due to fear and lack of legal or practical protection from recrimination or other negative consequences when 
they report cases of corruption, neither civil servants nor private sector employees are willing to be a 
whistleblower (Global Integrity 2010), thus collaborating the finding of this study. The study finding also reveals 
that the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) is the main anti-corruption agency in Cameroon with 
capacities to investigate, gather and analyse allegations and information about corrupt practices. However, 
CONAC cannot freeze, seize or confiscate assets, nor does it have the power to refer cases to court or other 
disciplinary institutions. CONAC lack independent and is under the authority of the president and the chairman, 
making the impartiality of the institution questionable. Based on the finding of this study the respondents ranked 
CONAC as an ineffective agency. This collaborate the finding of Global Integrity 2010, that CONAC is not 
protected from political interference and does not have power to carry out its mandate in practice. It is further 
noted that the agency does not act on complaints within a reasonable time period and does not initiate 
investigations independently when necessary. 
Although, almost all the anti-corruption initiatives are ranked ineffective, only the CHOC-Cameroon programme 
(Change Habits, Oppose Corruption- 52%) are considered to be effective. The US Department of State 2012 
notes that since the inception of the CHOC programme in 2007, legal, strategic and institutional instruments 
have been developed to effectively fight corruption.  
Table 2: Cameroonian Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
Total No. of Respondent's View % of Respondent's View % of
Respondents on Anti-corruption View on Anti-corruption View
effective policies ineffective policies
Legislation: Penal Code (bribery, extortion, money laundering & misuse of public funds) 615 271 44% 344 56%
Government Strategies: The CHOC-Cameroon programme (Change Habits, Oppose Corruption) 615 317 52% 298 48%
Anti-Corruption Agency: The National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) 615 242 39% 373 61%
National Agency for Financial Investigations (ANIF): 615 287 47% 328 53%
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 615 243 40% 372 60%
E-Governance 615 277 45% 338 55%
Public Procurement: (Public Contract Code) 615 289 47% 326 53%
Whistleblowing: 615 186 30% 429 70%
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Table 4.3 and figure 1 enumerated some perceived causes of fraud and corruption practices in Cameroon. 
Finding identified factors that pose challenges to the effective fight against FAC practices in public sector. The 
respondents view that lack of commitment of leadership, low salaries in the public sector, economic problems 
(inflation/ High cost of living), Social inequality/ Wrong values, and Self-serving tendencies/ Get-rich-quick 
syndrome are among the causes of increase in the level of FAC practices in doing business in Cameroon. 
However, a significant percentage of the respondents(see figure 1) in this study strongly disagree with above 
notion but instead perceived lack of control (supervision, auditing, etc), taste not commensurate with status in 
life, Inadequate motivation-job role, work environment and Increasing strength of organized crime as responsible 
factors that influence FAC practices. 
4.1 Conclusion 
Cameroon still faces multiple challenges in curbing corruption: the sectors of customs, police, Judicial System, 
Public Procurement and Contracting, Environment, and Natural Resources and Extractive Industry are all 
particularly prone to corruption. This could be as a result of insincerity and lack of political will by the 
government to fight fraud and corruption in the system. The increase in FAC practice in doing business in 
Cameroon is partially due to the immunity enjoyed by the corrupted and the corrupters, the degradation of the 
living conditions of workers, lack of commitment of leadership, low salaries in the public sector, economic 
problems (inflation/ High cost of living), Social inequality/ Wrong values, and Self-serving tendencies/ Get-rich-
quick syndrome. There is need to question the effectiveness of punitive action against corruption and enabling 
law in Cameroon especially National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) is the main anti-corruption agency 
with capacities to investigate, gather and analyses allegations and information about corrupt practices. But 
cannot freeze, seize or confiscate assets, nor does it have the power to refer cases to court or other disciplinary 
institutions. CONAC lack independent and is under the authority of the president and the chairman, making the 
impartiality of the institution questionable 
 
Also, the need not to underrate the social impact of measures taken to improve the living conditions of the public 
in general and of public sector workers in particular. But the analysis of data gathered in this study shows that 
there is need to look beyond the perceived causes of FAC practices given by our respondents. The solution to 
agent principal relationship theory problem in public sector, most especially in developing economy, could be 
good pension incentives and fat gratuities after completing tenure in office with “modify Chinese solution” may 
align elected leaders/representatives with electorates’ goals and aspirations. Modify Chinese solution is 
empowering independent anti-corruption agencies, special independent fraud court to jail any indicted public 
officers, elected leaders/representatives to long term sentences and made to lose all their belongings to the state 
to serve as deterrence to others.  Also, independent of anti-corruption agencies will go a long way in fighting the 
menace of fraud and corruption practices in the system. 
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